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No More Russian Roulette: Chapter 13
"Cram-down" Creditors Take a Bullet
Till v. SCS Credit Corp.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Until the United States Supreme Court's decision in Till v. SCS Credit
Corp.,2 secured creditors in Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases likely viewed the
forced acceptance of a debtor's Chapter 13 repayment plan as a high-stakes
game of chance. Prior to this decision, the interest rate applied to the deferred
payments to "cram-down" creditors 3 varied dramatically, depending upon the
jurisdiction in which the debtor filed bankruptcy and the broad discretion of
the bankruptcy court judge. However, by misinterpreting the legislative intent
of Congress, the Supreme Court adopted a standard that will consistently
under-compensate creditors. Suddenly, secured creditors' high-stakes game
of chance has become a game of Russian Roulette using a fully-loaded gun -
no longer do they even have hope of escaping a harsh result.
In addition, the economic impact of the court's decision may extend
well beyond the profit margins of Chapter 13 creditors. To compensate for
their low rate of return in bankruptcy cases, creditors will likely increase in-
terest rates to all borrowers. This reaction could both dampen consumer con-
fidence and force additional debtors into bankruptcy. The Court indicated Till
may also apply to equivalent cram-down provisions in Chapter 11 corporate
reorganization plans. As the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 20054 becomes law, the economic ripple effect of Till will
be magnified as even greater numbers of debtors are funneled into Chapter 13
bankruptcy.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On October 2, 1998, Lee and Amy Till purchased a used truck from In-
stant Auto Finance ("Instant Auto") for $6,725.75, including fees and taxes.5
1. 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
2. Id.
3. The term "cram-down" refers a statutory provision allowing a bankruptcy
judge to confirm a debtor's Chapter 13 debt repayment plan over the objection of the
creditor. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text; 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)
(2000).
4. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S. 256,
109th Congress (2005).
5. Till, 541 U.S. at 469 (plurality opinion). The purchase price of the truck was
$6,395 plus $330.75 in fees and taxes. Id.
1
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They made a $300 down payment and financed the remaining balance by
entering into a retail installment contract with Instant Auto. 6 The contract
provided for sixty-eight bi-weekly payments spread over 136 weeks with an
annual interest rate of 21%.7 The resulting $1,859.49 interest obligation
brought the Tills' total indebtedness to $8,285.24.8 Instant Auto immediately
assigned the contract to SCS Credit Corporation (SCS). 9 As provided in the
contract, SCS retained a purchase money security interest, which gave SCS
the right to repossess the truck if the Tills defaulted on the contract. 10
A year later, the Tills were in default on their payments to SCS and
other creditors." On October 25, 1999, they filed a joint Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy petition. 12 The bankruptcy petition placed an automatic stay on the
debt-collection activity of SCS and the Tills' other creditors. '3 In addition, the
filing created a trustee-administered bankruptcy estate that included the
truck.' 4 At the time of the filing, the Tills' outstanding debt to SCS amounted
to $4,894.89, while the truck securing the debt was worth only $4,000.' 5 Un-
der the Bankruptcy Code, SCS's secured claim was limited to $4,000,16 and
the remaining $894.89 balance was retained as an unsecured claim.'
7
The Tills proposed a three-year debt adjustment plan requiring them to
submit $740 of their wages to the court-appointed bankruptcy trustee each





11. Id. In addition to SCS, other creditors included in the Tills' bankruptcy peti-
tion included the Internal Revenue Service, three other holders of secured claims, and
unidentified unsecured creditors. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. I I U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000) provides:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the
estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of
such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property, . . . and is
an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest
or the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed
claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valua-
tion and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in con-
junction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting
such creditor's interest.
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month. According to the plan, the trustee would then distribute the assigned
wages to the appropriate creditors according to the following priority: (1)
administrative costs, (2) the Internal Revenue Service's priority tax claim, (3)
claims of secured creditors, and (4) claims of unsecured creditors.19
The proposed plan also provided that the Tills would pay interest on the
secured portion of SCS's claim at a rate of 9.5% per year. 20 They arrived at
this "formula rate" by taking the national prime rate of approximately 8%21
and adding 1.5% for an estimated risk of non-payment. 22 SCS objected to the
proposed rate, claiming it was entitled to a "forced loan rate" of 21%, the rate
it would earn if it foreclosed on the debt and reinvested the funds by making
loans to comparable debtors."
The bankruptcy court held a hearing on the issue, and SCS presented
expert testimony that creditors routinely receive 21% interest on loans to
debtors with poor credit ratings. 24 The Tills argued a court-supervised repay-
ment plan limited the risk of non-payment and, consequently, should reduce
the interest rate.25 The bankruptcy trustee supported the Tills' use of the for-
mula rate. 26 The trustee reasoned this method makes the appropriate rate eas-
ily ascertainable based on the present condition of the financial market, rather
than making an independent inquiry into the circumstances of the individual
creditor.27 After considering the testimony, the bankruptcy court overruled
SCS's objection and confirmed the Tills' proposed plan using the formula
rate.
28
18. Id. at 470. The Tills' original plan called for $1,089 of their wages to be
assigned to the trustee every month, but the Tills later amended their plan to require a
payment of only $740 per month. Id. at 471 n.7.
19. Id. at 471.
20. Id.
21. Id. The prime rate is generally the rate applied by banks to low-risk loans. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 471-72.
24. Id. at 471. SCS referred to its focus on borrowers with low credit ratings as
the "subprime" market. Id. It noted SCS was not alone in charging this rate; other
creditors in this market regularly charge 21% on loans to customers with poor credit.
Id.
25. Id. at 472. During the hearing, an Indiana University/Purdue University-
Indianapolis economics professor testified on behalf of the Tills. Id. at 471. After
acknowledging his familiarity with the "subprime" auto lending market was limited,
he asserted his belief that the 9.5% formula rate was "very reasonable," given that
Chapter 13 plans are "supposed to be financially feasible." Id. at 471-72 (referring to
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2000), which dictates the bankruptcy judge should only "con-
firm a plan if... the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to
comply with the plan"). The professor believed SCS's risk in this case was "fairly
limited because [the Tills were] under the supervision of the court." Id. at 472.
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The district court reversed the opinion of the bankruptcy court, agreeing
with SCS that a forced loan rate should be applied. 29 In the absence of con-
trary testimony, the court concluded 21% was the prevailing rate in SCS's
target market and was, therefore, the appropriate rate that should be applied to
its secured claim.
30
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit adopted a third approach that attempted
to ascertain the interest rate "the creditor in question would obtain in making
a new loan in the same industry to a debtor who is similarly situated, although
not in bankruptcy."' 3' The majority noted the new loan rate could be approxi-
mated by looking to the parties' pre-bankruptcy contract rate.32 However, the
court observed this rate would not "duplicat[e] precisely ... the present value
of the collateral to the creditor" because loans to debtors in bankruptcy "in-
volve some risks that would not be incurred in a new loan to a debtor not in
default" and conversely involve "some economies" as well. 33 The court con-
cluded the parties' pre-bankruptcy contract rate should merely be the "pre-
sumptive contract rate." 34 The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the bank-
ruptcy court to allow each ?,arty the opportunity to present evidence in rebut-
tal of this presumptive rate.
3
.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Rovner argued in favor of a fourth ap-
36proach. Rovner asserted the presumptive contract rate approach adopted by
the majority was inflated because it did not consider the transactional costs
incurred by the creditor if it used the recovered funds in the issuance of new
loans. 37 As a solution, Judge Rovner suggested a "cost of funds" rate valued
at "what it would cost the creditor to obtain the cash equivalent of the collat-




31. Id. (quoting In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2002)).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 472-73.
34. Id. at 477-78.
35. Id. In this case, the remand would likely benefit only the Tills. As residents
of Indiana, the Tills are subject to Indiana's usury statute, which caps the maximum
interest rate at 21%. Id. at 473 n.9 (citing IND. CODE § 244.5-3-201 (1993)). Because
the Seventh Circuit placed the presumptive contract rate at 21%, any modification to
this amount would presumably be in the form of a reduction. Id. at 473 n.9.
36. Id. at 473 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (Rovner, J., dissenting).
38. In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 595-96 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rovner, J., dissenting).
Judge Rovner also noted that, although the values produced by the formula rate or the
cost of funds rate approaches were relatively small compared to the forced loan rate
or presumptive contract rate methods, courts should "consider the extent to which the
creditor has already been compensated for ... the risk that the debtor will be unable
to discharge his obligations under the reorganization plan ... in the rate of interest
that it charged to the debtor in return for the original loan." Id. at 596.
1388 [Vol. 70
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to divine the proper
method for determining the interest rate from among the abundance of con-
flicting, lower-court opinions. 39 The Court held the formula approach, adding
a small risk adjustment to the national prime rate, was appropriate for deter-




The United States Constitution provides "[t]he Congress shall have
Power ... [t]o establish . . .uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States."41 In 1938, with the enactment of the Chandler
Act, Congress created consumer bankruptcy provisions allowing debtors to
42
repay their debts over time. Prior to the creation of this provision, debtors'
only bankruptcy option was "straight bankruptcy," which required the liqui-
dation of all non-exempt assets.43 This new bankruptcy tool was intended to
benefit creditors, who would generally get more money than liquidation
bankruptcy would provide, and to benefit debtors, who could retain their as-
sets throughout the bankruptcy process.44
In 1978, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act, which replaced
the consumer bankruptcy provision of the Chandler Act,4 5 yet maintained its
intent. The new Bankruptcy Code ("the Code") included a provision for
Chapter 13 bankruptcies. 46 Chapter 13 allows individual debtors to retain
their assets while restructuring their debts and repaying their creditors over a
period of time.47 A Chapter 13 debtor is required to submit a debt adjustment
plan for court approval. 48 The bankruptcy court will approve a plan only if it
accommodates secured creditors in one of the following three ways: (1) the
creditor accepts the plan, (2) the debtor surrenders the property securing the
claim, or (3) the creditor retains a lien on the property securing its claim and
the debtor's future payments have at least as much "value, as of the effective
date of the plan" as the creditor's secured claim.49 This third option has been
39. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 539 U.S. 925 (2003) (mem.).
40. Till, 541 U.S. at 479-80 (plurality opinion).
41. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 4.
42. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978).
43. In re Scher, 12 B.R. 258, 261 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
44. Id. at 268.
45. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 [hereinaf-
ter "the Code"].
46. H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1977).
47. Id.
48. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1325 (2000).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (2000). This section states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if.
. (5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-
2005] 1389
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labeled the "cram-down" provision because the statute allows for judicial
confirmation of a debtor's repayment plan over the objection of the creditor.50
In 1993, the Supreme Court noted in Rake v. Wade that the future prop-
erty distributions defined in the cram-down provision may take the form of "a
stream of future payments." 51 However, the statute does not specifically state
that an interest rate be applied to compensate creditors for delayed pay-
ments. 2 In Rake, the Court noted there are numerous references in the Code
where payments are "discount[ed] ... back to the present dollar value of the
claim at confirmation." 53 Although the Court acknowledged the need to apply
some interest rate to deferred payments to cram-down creditors, the court
declined to identify the specific interest rate that should be employed. 4
In the absence of clear guidelines, district courts have failed to establish
a standard interest rate valuation method. The methods adopted by various
courts have included the forced loan rate,55 cost of funds rate,5 contract
rate, s the state statutory rate,58 treasury bill rate,59 prime rate,6 market rate,6'
- (A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan; (B)(i) the plan pro-
vides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distrib-
uted under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed
amount of such claim; or (C) the debtor surrenders the property securing
such claim to such holder.
Id.
50. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 468-69 (2004) (plurality opinion).
51. 508 U.S. 464, 472 n.8 (1993).
52. See supra note 49.
53. Rake, 508 U.S. at 472 n.8.
54. Id.
55. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
57. See In re Einspahr, 30 B.R. 356, 356 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (reasoning the
contract rate was a fair rate because the parties agreed to it); In re Evans, 20 B.R. 175,
176-77 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (limiting the discount rate on the bank loan to the origi-
nal 6% rate rather than revaluating it based on the prevailing market rate); In re Kauf-
funger, 16 B.R. 666, 669 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981) (holding the contract rate should be ap-
plied because Congressional legislative history suggests a presumption that the rates
originally agreed upon by the parties are equivalent to the discount rate); In re Hartford,
7 B.R. 914, 917-18 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981) (memorandum decision) (applying the origi-
nal home mortgage rate to the payments to the bank under the debtor's Chapter 13
plan); In re Smith, 4 B.R. 12, 13 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding the secured creditor
should be given an interest rate of 12.68%, the original contract rate on the car loan).
58. See In re Crockett, 3 B.R. 365, 368 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1980) (holding the Illi-
nois statutory rate of 9% was appropriate to compensate secured creditors for Chapter
13 installment payments).
59. See In re Trent, 42 B.R. 279, 282 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984) (holding that the
rate imposed on cram-down loans be based on the United States Treasury Bills rate at
the time of Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing); In re Corliss, 43 B.R. 176, 179 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1984) (discounting future payments based on the yield rate of the 52-week treas-
1390 [Vol. 70
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agreed rate,62 Internal Revenue Code rate,63 compromised rate,64 and the liq-
uidation/reinvestment rate. Because courts failed to reach a consensus as to
the interest rate applied to the delayed payments to cram-down creditors, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the dispute.
66
ury bills); In re Jewell, 25 B.R. 44, 46 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (valuing delayed pay-
ments based on the 52-week treasury bills rate on the date of filing); Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Willis (In re Willis), 6 B.R. 555, 557 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1980)
(capping the interest rate to no greater than 0.5% above the auction average of 3-
month United States Treasury Bills rate as of the Monday of the week in which the
debtor filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy).
60. See In re Bivens, 317 B.R. 755, 764 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 2004) (applying the
risk-free prime rate of 4.75%, and adding a risk factor interest rate to compensate for
the risk to the creditor); In re Smith, 310 B.R. 631, 633-34 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004)
(starting with the national prime rate, then conducting an evidentiary hearing to gauge
the proper risk adjustment for each loan).
61. See In re Chang, 274 B.R. 295, 305 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (holding the "mar-
ket rate plus" method would be employed when a creditor is forced to accept a loan
rather than entering the transaction voluntarily); In re Crompton, 73 B.R. 800, 807
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (reducing the interest rate from the original contract amount after
concluding the market rate had dropped since the original mortgage was signed); In re
Webb, 29 B.R. 280, 286 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (scheduling a hearing to determine
investment opportunities after concluding the creditor was entitled to the rate at which
the creditor would be compensated if the lump sum payment were invested).
62. See In re Pokrzywinski, 311 B.R. 846, 850-51 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004)
(memorandum decision) (reasoning the 5.75% agreed rate would not be too high as to
put the repayment of the plan in jeopardy); In re Gregory, 8 B.R. 256, 258 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1981) (applying a 7% rate to cram-down payments because the creditor and
debtor both agreed to this rate).
63. See In re Johnson, 8 B.R. 503, 506 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981) (memorandum
opinion) (applying the IRS rate from 26 U.S.C.A. § 6621 to all cram-down creditors
in the interest of administrative efficiency); In re Busman, 5 B.R. 332, 341 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1980) (rejecting the debtor's plan of no-interest installment payments to the
Internal Revenue Service and adopting the interest rate identified in 26 U.S.C.A. §
6621 of the Internal Revenue Code).
64. See Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Miller (In re Miller), 13 B.R. 110, 113
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1981) (averaging the original contract rate and the market rate on
similar loans to arrive at the discount rate for cram-down payments).
65. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Olson (In re Olson), 300 B.R. 96, 98 (Bankr.
S.D. Ga. 2003) (determining value of the payments based on (1) the liquidation value
of the property had the debtor surrendered it, and (2) the rate at which the creditor
could reinvest the funds to borrowers who were similarly situated to the debtor and
seeking similar financing).
66. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 539 U.S. 925 (2003) (mem.).
2005)
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Plurality Opinion
Justice Stevens authored the plurality opinion and was joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 67 Justice Stevens noted that the Code provides
little guidance as to the rate to apply to the deferred payments made to cram-
down creditors in Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases.68 The relevant section of the
Code mentions neither the word "interest" nor the term "discount rate." 69 The
Code merely requires the distribution to the secured creditor must have a total
"value, as of the effective date of the plan," of at least as much as the allowed
secured claim.70 While this mandate is clearly met if the creditor were paid
the full amount of its claim on the day of the bankruptcy filing, the statute's
requirements are less clear when the payments are spread over time.
71
Justice Stevens acknowledged that a debtor's promise to make future
payments was worth less than an immediate payment because of inflation and
risk of nonpayment.72 In selecting an appropriate interest rate scheme to com-
pensate the creditor for these burdens, the plurality took into account three
"important considerations."
73
First, there are numerous references in the Code requiring courts to en-
sure creditors receive their proper claim value by discounting future payments
back to their value as of the time of bankruptcy filing.74 Justice Stevens sur-
67. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465,468 (2004).
68. Id. at 473-74 (plurality opinion).
69. Id. at 473; see II U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) (2000).
70. Id. at 473-74 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2000)). In this case the
"value, as of the effective date of the plan" must be at least as much as $4,000, the
amount of SCS's secured claim against the Tills' truck. Id.
71. Id. at 474.
72. Id. Although Justice Stevens acknowledged that inflation and the risk of non-
payment are factors leading to the discount of future payments, notably absent from his
list is any reference to "opportunity costs." In terms of creditors such as SCS, opportu-
nity costs include forgone interest revenue from new loans. To include opportunity costs
as a factor in the time value of money analysis would be to argue in favor of the pre-
sumptive contract rate approach advocated by the dissent. See infra Part IV.C.
73. Till, 541 U.S. at 474 (plurality opinion).
74. Id. (citing Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 472 n.8 (1993)). These references in
the Code include 11 U.S.C. § 1129(aX7XA)(ii) (2000), which requires payment of
property whose "value, as of the effective date of the plan" equals or exceeds the value
of the creditor's claim; 11 U.S.C. § I 129(a)(7)(B) (2000), which requires that secured
creditors in Chapter 11 be compensated for the "value, as of the effective date of the
plan," of the property securing the claim; 11 U.S.C. § 1129(aX9)(B)(i) (2000), which
allows confirmation of Chapter II plans to certain priority creditors if the creditors are
compensated for the full "value, as of the effective date of the plan," of their allowed
claims; I 1 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9XC) (2000), which requires governmental units in Chapter
11 cases be compensated for the "value, as of the effective date of the plan," of certain
1392 [Vol. 70
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mised that Congress intended courts to apply a similar approach for deferred
payments to cram down creditors. 75 He further theorized that Congress would
want a method "familiar in the financial community" which would minimize
the need for extensive evidentiary hearings.
76
The Court's second consideration was that the Code gives courts the ex-
press authority in Chapter 13 cases to modify the rights of secured creditors.77
Justice Stevens reasoned that this provision allows the court to change the
number, timing, or amount of the debtor's payments under the original con-
tract to account for changes in circumstance.78 The fact that the debtor is in
bankruptcy indicates a simultaneous increase in the risk of default because
the debtor is overextended and a countervailing decrease in risk because the
process will be supervised by the court.
79
tax claims within six years; 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2000), which mandates
Chapter 11 secured creditors be given the "indubitable equivalent" of their claims; 11
U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000), which requires Chapter 11 unsecured creditors in a
lower-ranked class are not compensated until creditors in higher-ranked class are fully
compensated for their claim's "value, as of the effective date of the plan;" II U.S.C. §
I 129(b)(2)(C)(i) (2000), which specifies the "value" of class interests is determined "as
of the effective date of the plan;" 11 U.S.C. § 1173(a)(2) (2000), which requires credi-
tors under railroad reorganization plans receive the "value, as of the effective date of the
plan," as the creditor would have received if the railroad's assets were liquidated under
Chapter 7; 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4) (2000), which allows for plan confirmation only
when payments to unsecured Chapter 12 creditors have at least the "value, as of the
effective date of the plan," as the creditor would have received if the debtor's estate
were liquidated under Chapter 7; 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2000), which allows for plan
confirmation only when payments to unsecured Chapter 13 creditors have at least the
"value, as of the effective date of the plan," as the creditor would have received if the
debtor's estate were liquidated under Chapter 7; and I I U.S.C. § 1228(b)(2) (2000),
which allows for early discharge under Chapter 12, only if creditors have received at
least the "value, as of the effective date of the plan," as the creditor would have received
if the debtor's estate were liquidated under Chapter 7.
75. Till, 541 U.S. at 474 (plurality opinion).
76. Id. at 474-45.
77. Id. at 475 (noting that 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2000) states, "[T]he plan may
... modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by
a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence, ... or leave
unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims").
78. Id.
79. Id. Justice Stevens indicated the reduction in the creditor's risk of default is
produced by the following four factors: (1) per 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2000), bank-
ruptcy judges only approve debt adjustment plans when they believe the debtor will be
able to make the scheduled payments; (2) per § 1322(aX) (2000), Chapter 13 plans
must "provide for the submission" to the trustee "of all or such portion of [the debtor's]
future ... income.., as is necessary for the execution of the plan," thus reducing the
possibility of nonpayment; (3) the Code requires extensive disclosure to reduce the
likelihood of undisclosed obligations; and (4) the debtor's bankruptcy status will likely
reduce the debtor's opportunities to acquire additional debt. Id. at 474 n. 12.
2005] 1393
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Third, the Court had previously determined the cram-down provision
should be evaluated using an objective standard.8 0 This standard does not
obligate the courts to match the terms of the individual creditor's pre-
bankruptcy contract.8s In fact, the very nature of the cram-down provision
indicates that the creditor is being forced to accept future payments over its
82preference of foreclosure. Instead, the court should treat similarly situated
creditors similarly83 and seek to ensure creditors are compensated for the risk
of default and the time value of money.
8 4
Based upon these three considerations, the plurality rejected the forced
loan rate, presumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches. 8 Justice
Stevens noted these approaches are not only complicated, but also involve
increased evidentiary costs. 86 Additionally, these approaches attempt to
"make each individual creditor whole" rather than merely ensuring future
payments are adequate to provide creditors with the present value of their
secured claims.87 Finally, the plurality argued that the approaches starting
80. Id. at 476 (citing Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997)
(holding "a creditors secured interest should be valued from the debtor's, rather than
the creditor's, perspective").
81. Id.
82. Id. Justice Stevens observed the fact that these cram-down loans are forced
on a creditor over its objections helps explain why there is no readily apparent Chap-
ter 13 free market of cram-down lenders from which a court can derive an appropriate
market interest rate. Id. at 476 n.14. In contrast, there are many creditors who adver-
tise to Chapter 11 debtors which might allow a bankruptcy court to look at the market
to determine the going rate. See id. at 477.
83. Id. at 477 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3) (2000) ("The plan shall.., provide
the same treatment for each claim within a particular class")).
84. Id.
85. Id. To examine the forced loan rate approach, see supra note 23 and accom-
panying text; for the presumptive contract rate approach, see supra notes 31-35 and
accompanying text; and for cost of funds approach, see supra note 38 and accompa-
nying text.
86. Till, 541 U.S. at 477 (plurality opinion).
87. Id. Justice Stevens addressed the weaknesses of each of these three methods,
First, the forced loan approach requires bankruptcy courts to examine the market for
non-bankrupt debtors, which is outside the usual scope of examining the individual
debtor's situation and ability to meet the demands of their debt adjustment plan. Id.
The approach also overcompensates creditors because the market rate provides com-
pensation for transaction costs and profits which are not relevant factors in setting an
interest rate for court-supervised cram-down creditors. Id.
Similarly, the presumptive contract rate approach turns the courts' focus
outside of the debtors' situations and looks at creditors' possible alternate uses of the
proceeds. Id. Because this presumptive rate can be rebutted, the debtors must under-
take the task of obtaining information about the creditors' individual financial situa-
tions and lending practices. Id. at 477-78. In addition, this method rewards inefficient,
poorly managed creditors with higher rates than its competent, more efficient coun-
terparts. Id. at 478.
1394 [Vol. 70
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with the rates charged by subprime lenders are flawed because they assume
these markets are competitive and incorporate a fair rate.
8 9
The plurality noted the formula rate approach does not contain these
flaws. This approach begins with the national prime rate, which is then
Finally, Justice Stevens claimed the focus of the cost of funds approach is
also misguided. 1d. Although it correctly disregards the parties' pre-bankruptcy deal-
ings, it mistakenly turns courts' attention to the creditworthiness of creditors rather
than of debtors. Id. As with the presumptive contract rate approach, the cost of funds
approach requires additional evidentiary tasks of debtors by effectively requiring
expert testimony about creditors' financial situations to rebut creditors' assertions. Id.
Additionally, this method, again, rewards the less efficient, poorly managed lender.
Id.
88. Id. at 481. The plurality argued that subprime loans are not bargained for
between "fully informed buyers and sellers in a classic free market." Id. at 481-82.
These loans usually arise as a result of "tie-in" transactions with car dealerships. Id. at
481. The cost of the car is often the focus of the negotiation with the interest rates
dictated by the seller once an agreement has been reached on the purchase price of the
automobile. Id.
The dissent, however, took issue with this "unsubstantiated assertion" that
car buyers do not bargain for interest rates. Id. at 495 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Advertis-
ing promotions such as "zero-percent financing" indicated customers are aware of
interest rates as well as price. Id.
89. Id. at 481-82 (plurality opinion). The plurality noted that the significant regula-
tions focused on the subprime lending market reflects legislative belief that "unregulated
subprime lenders would exploit borrowers' ignorance and charge rates above what a
competitive market would allow." Id. at 482. A prime example of this regulation are
state usury laws which place a cap on the maximum interest rate that can be charged. Id.
at 482 n.22 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-2-201 (2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 537.011
(Supp. 2004); IND. CODE § 24-4.5-3- 201 (1995); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-
404(d) (2000)). In support of its view that the subprime market is exploitative in nature,
the plurality pointed to lending practices where no usury laws have been passed. Id. at
482 n.23. In Mississippi, for example, left unchecked by the legislature, rates in the
subprime market have reached "as high as 30 to 40%." Id. (citing Norberg, Consumer
Bankruptcy's New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in
Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415, 438-439 (1999)).
The dissent questioned the plurality's use of usury laws to support a conclu-
sion that the subprime market is exploitative. Id. at 496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia acknowledged this is one possible interpretation, but suggested instead that the
purpose of usery laws could also be a "primitive means of social insurance" which
provides artificially low interest rates for high-risk debtors. Id. (citing Glaeser &
Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest
Restrictions and Usury Laws, 41 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 26 (1998)).
90. Id. at 478 (plurality opinion).
91. Id. at 478-79. The national prime rate is the financial market's estimate of the
rate a commercial bank should charge a creditworthy commercial customer. Id. The
rate is designed to compensate the lender for opportunity costs, the risk of inflation,
and a minimal risk of default. Id. The rate is familiar to the financial community and
readily ascertainable as it is reported daily in the press. Id.
2005] 1395
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adjusted to compensate creditors for the risk of nonpayment posed by a par-
ticular debtor.92 Unlike the methods previously examined by the Court, the
formula rate approach puts the evidentiary burden on the creditor to establish
any upward adjustment to the interest rate.93 Much of the relevant evidence is
likely to be included in the debtor's bankruptcy filings and already in the
hands of the parties, thereby minimizing the expense of evidentiary fact find-
ing.94 Additionally, the focus of a court's inquiry will be properly placed on
the debtor's financial situation rather than the creditor's circumstances.
95
Accordingly, the plurality concluded the "formula rate best comports with the
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code."
96
The Court declined to define the limits of the risk adjustment, but noted
courts have generally approved adjustments from 1% to 3%.97 In this case,
the bankruptcy court approved a risk adjustment of 1.5%. 98 The Court re-
versed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded
the case to the bankruptcy court for proceedings consistent with its opinion.
99
B. The Concurrence
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, agreed with Justice Stevens
that the interest rate given to Chapter 13 cram-down creditors should be based
on the national prime rate, but he questioned the need to adjust the rate to
account for any additional risk of nonpaymentL°° Justice Thomas acknowl-
edged that a "promise of future payments is worth less than an immediate
payment" of the same amount due, at least in part, to the risk of nonpay-
ment.101 He argued, however, that this is irrelevant because the statute does
92. Id. at 479. Justice Stevens noted that, if bankruptcy courts could guarantee
debtor compliance with the terms of the debt reorganization plan, the prime rate
would be sufficient to compensate the secured cram-down creditor. Id. at 479 n.18.
Absent a judicial guarantee, however, some risk of nonpayment will continue to exist.
Id. at 479 n.18. As a result, the court must consider the debtor's individual circum-
stances, including the nature of the security and the duration and feasibility of the
reorganization plan in determining the amount of adjustment the court will make to




96. Id. at 479-80. Justice Stevens acknowledged that "[i]f we have misinterpreted
Congress' intended meaning of 'value, as of the date of the plan,' we are confident it
will enact appropriate remedial legislation." Id. at 480 n. 19.
97. Id. at 480 (citing Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti),
105 F.3d 55, 64 (2d Cir. 1997) for a collection of cases).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 485.
100. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
101. Id. (emphasis omitted).
1396 [Vol. 70
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not ask the court to value the promise to distribute property under the plan.' 02
Rather, the court is to ensure that the value of the property to be distributed
under the plan, at the time of the effective date of the plan, is not less than the
amount of the secured creditor's claim. '
03
Justice Thomas argued that the plurality ignored "the clear text of the
statute in an apparent rush to ensure that secured creditors [were] not under-
compensated."' According to Justice Thomas, the statute clearly indicates
that a requirement to determine the "value" of the distributed property "as of
the effective date of the plan incorporates the principle of the time value of
money."' 1 5 No statute, however, indicates that the appropriate interest rate
must also include the risk of nonpayment. 16 The statute requires valuation of
the "property to be distributed," not the valuation of the debt repayment plan
(i.e., the debtor's promise to make the scheduled payments). 107 Thus, to sat-
isfy section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), it is sufficient that the plan incorporate an in-
terest rate that compensates the creditor for the delayed payments and need
not include an additional risk premium. 0 8 Justice Thomas noted, "[iun most,
if not all, cases, where the plan proposes simply a stream of cash payments,
the appropriate risk-free rate should suffice."'
10 9
Justice Thomas deduced that the issue then became whether the pro-
posed 9.5% interest rate in the Tills' debt plan had sufficiently compensated
SCS for receiving $4,000 plus 9.5% interest over a period of up to three years
rather than receiving $4,000 immediately." 0 Because the 9.5% rate was
higher than the national prime rate, Justice Thomas concluded that the com-
pensation to SCS was sufficient and concurred that the judgment of the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals should be reversed.'
102. Id. at 485-86.
103. Id. at 486 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2000)).
104. ld.
105. Id. at 486-87. Justice Thomas further clarified the concept of the time value
of money by stating: "To put it simply, $4,000 today is worth more than $4,000 to be
received 17 months from today because if received today, the $4,000 can be invested
to start earning interest immediately." Id. at 487 (citing ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING
& FINANCE 1015 (9th ed. 1991)).
For example, if the relevant interest rate is 10%, receiving $4,000 one
year from now is the equivalent to receiving $3,636.36 today. In other
words, an investor would be indifferent to receiving $3,636.36 today and
receiving $4,000 one year from now because each will equal $4,000 one
year from now.
Id. at 487 n. 1.
106. Id. at 489.
107. Id. at 487.
108. Id.
109. Id.




Jordan: Jordan: No More Russian Roulette:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
C. The Dissent
Justice Scalia was joined in his dissenting opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy." 2 Justice Scalia argued the
plurality's adoption of the formula approach would "systematically under-
compensate" cram-down creditors." s The formula approach begins with the
prime lending rate, a rate which eight of the nine justices agreed was too low
to compensate for the risk of default."14 This method then requires the bank-
ruptcy judge to determine the amount of increase in every case. 11 5
Instead, the dissent argued in favor of the presumptive contract rate as
the starting point in a court's determination.l16 Because the contract rate is the
rate at which the creditor actually loaned its funds to the debtor, it provides a
good indication of the actual risk of default in each case.11 7 This presumptive
rate can then be challenged by either party and modified accordingly by the
bankruptcy judge." 8
Justice Scalia noted the presumptive contract rate approach is based on
two reasonable assumptions." 19 It assumes the subprime lending market is
competitive, and it assumes the risk of default to Chapter 13 creditors is usu-
ally not less than the risk at the time of lending. 120 Justice Scalia addressed
each of these assumptions in turn.
1 21
First, in support of the assumption the subprime lending market is com-
petitive, Justice Scalia relied primarily on logical deduction. 22 He reasoned
that if lenders charged excessive rates, competitors could undercut these rates,
and the uncompetitive, inefficient lenders would be effectively forced out of
the market. 23 Justice Scalia supported this assumption by pointing to a study
concluding that lenders in the subprime market were twice as likely to be
unprofitable, suggesting a "fiercely competitive environment. '' 124 Accepting
this assumption, Justice Scalia concluded that the high interest rates charged
by subprime lenders accurately reflect the high risk of default for a particular
debtor. 125
112. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 491-92.
114. Id. at 491.
115. Id.




120. Id. at 492-93.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 492.
123. Id.
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Second, Justice Scalia believed it was also reasonable to assume that the
risks and costs of default are not diminished when a debtor enters Chapter 13
bankruptcy. 26 Recent studies indicate a failure rate of at least 37% among
judicially confirmed Chapter 13 bankruptcy plans' 27 Although court over-
sight may provide the creditor "some marginal benefit," any benefit is
dwarfed by the fact the bankruptcy alone indicates a "financial instability"
beyond that of most subprime debtors.128 Additionally, bankruptcy introduces
additional costs of default for the secured creditor including depreciation,
29
lack of liquidity,' 30 and administrative costs of foreclosure.'
3 1
After estimating the value of each of these enumerated costs and factoring
in a 37% risk of default, Justice Scalia estimated the appropriate risk adjust-
ment in this case is 16% above the prime lending rate, or 24%. 132 Justice Scalia
suggested the plurality's estimate of a 1.5% risk adjustment is "far below any-
thing approaching fair compensation."' 33 In contrast, the presumptive contract
approach would set the default rate at 21%, a rate much closer to the actual risk
of default, and allow the parties to present evidence to rebut this presumption.'
34
126. Id. at 492-93.
127. Id. at 493 (citing Marjorie L. Girth, The Role of Empirical Data in Develop-
ing Bankruptcy Legislation for Individuals, 65 IND. L.J. 17, 40-42 (1989) (reporting a
63.1% success rate)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 494. Because the creditor's claim is secured by the value of the collat-
eral, depreciation inhibits the creditor's ability to fully recover in the event of default.
Id. at 502. Bankruptcy requires that cram-down creditors delay repossessing the prop-
erty and recovering its value, and this delay continues to affect the value of the collat-
eral over time as the property depreciates. Id. For example, when the Tills bought
their truck, the balance of the loan was roughly equal to the value of the collateral. Id.
However, by the time the debt repayment plan was confirmed, the balance of the loan
was $4,895, while the truck had depreciated to a mere $4,000. Id. Continued non-
payment would further widen this gap.
130. Id. at 499. The value of the property for the purposes of the cram-down provi-
sion is based on the debtor's replacement value. Id. at 502 (citing Assocs. Commercial
Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 965 (1997)). However, should the creditor foreclose on the
loan and sell the collateral property, the creditor will only be able to get a liquidation
price, due to the non-liquidity of the collateral markets. Id. at 502-03. Justice Scalia
notes that in Rash, the liquidation value of the truck used as collateral for the loan was
22% less than the replacement value. Id. at 503 n. 13 (citing Rash, 520 U.S. at 957).
131. Id. at 499. Chapter 13 cram-down creditors must comply with the require-
ments of the automatic stay provision, which prevents repossession of collateral. Id. at
503 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000)). To lift the stay, the creditor's attorney must file a
motion. Id. (citing § 362(d)). In the district court where the case arose, the cost of
filing this motion is currently $150. Id. (citation omitted). After adding in reasonable
attorney fees, Justice Scalia estimated the cost of the motion in this case would be
$650 or more. Id. (citation omitted).
132. Id. at 503-04.
133. Id. at 504.
134. Id. at 495 n.4.
13992005)
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Not only did Justice Scalia think an adoption of the presumptive con-
tract rate was a more accurate starting place, he suggested that it would also
prevent a ripple effect throughout the economy.'3 ' He reasoned that if cram-
down creditors are "systematically undercompensated," lenders will either
charge higher rates or decline to lend money to the riskiest debtors.'
36
The dissent criticized the plurality's opinion, suggesting that it "is
unlikely to burnish the Court's reputation for reasoned decisionmaking."'
37
Justice Scalia noted eight of the nine justices in this case agreed the rate given
to Chapter 13 cram-down creditors should reflect some premium for the risk
of default. 38 He concluded that the bankruptcy provision was intended to
provide "full risk compensation," and thus, the presumptive contract rate
approach should be adopted because it is the best method for attaining this
objective.139
V. COMMENT
A. Determining Legislative Intent
An examination of legislative history reveals support for the presump-
tive contract approach endorsed by the Till dissent. A cursory look into the
legislative history of section 1325(a)(5) provides little help in determining the
cram-down interest rate intended by the legislature. 40 However, a reading of
the original versions approved by each house of Congress reveals that a
debtor's Chapter 13 repayment plan should only be confirmed if it is in the
"best interests of creditors" to confirm the plan rather than require liquidation
under Chapter 7.141
While the "best interests" language was omitted in the final version of
the statute,( 42 courts have determined the purpose of this provision was "to





140. See 124 CONG. REC. H 11,107 (Sept. 28, 1978) which states:
Unless the secured creditor accepts the plan, the plan must provide that the secured
creditor retain the lien securing the creditor's allowed secured claim in addition to
receiving value, as of the effective date of the plan of property to be distributed un-
der the plan on account of the claim not less than the allowed amount of the claim.
(emphasis added).
141. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 142 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5928; H. REP. No. 95-595, at 430 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6385.
142. See 124 CONG. REc. HI 1,107 (Sept. 28, 1978) (stating "[s]ection 1325(a)(5)(B)
of the House amendment modifies the House bill and Senate amendment"). The con-
solidated version appears in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2000) (stating "the value, as of the
effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of each
[Vol. 701400
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put the secured creditor in an economic position equivalent to the one it
would have occupied had it received the allowed secured amount immedi-
ately, thus terminating the relationship between the creditor and the
debtor."'
143
To achieve this purpose, a bankruptcy court must determine the interest
rate a creditor would receive if the debtor's bankruptcy estate were liquidated
under Chapter 7 and the funds reinvested by the creditor in loans to other
borrowers. This process would lead the court to establish a market rate for




An adoption of the market rate, however, would require bankruptcy
courts to hold evidentiary hearings in every case to determine the rate at
which the creditor would lend funds to a similarly situated debtor. 145 Rather
than trying to glean the terms of a hypothetical agreement with a similarly-
situated debtor, why not set a default rate at the amount the creditor actually
agreed to lend to the debtor in question? In the interest of judicial efficiency,
the court could presume the contract rate previously agreed to by the parties
was appropriate and allow the parties to present evidence to rebut this pre-
sumption in cases where the original contract rate is no longer appropriate.
1 46
The adoption of the presumptive contract rate is further supported by
legislative history of another bankruptcy provision. 147 The Code provides that
unmatured interest will not be allowed as a bankruptcy claim for an unse-
cured or undersecured creditor. 14 According to the legislative history, this
disallowance represents a "discounting factor for claims" back to its value as
of the date of the bankruptcy filing. 149 Congress further clarified that "the
allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if
the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7").
143. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 66-67 (3d Cir. 1993).
144. United States v. Roso (In re Roso), 76 F.3d 179, 180 (8th Cir. 1996); see also
supra note 61.
145. This determination assumes the creditor is a commercial lender continuing in
the business of lending funds to similarly situated debtors. If this assumption is factu-
ally inconsistent with a given case, the court's adherence to the presumption of the
contract rate only serves as the starting place in the court's analysis and this rate can
be rebutted by one or both parties.
146. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 492 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing the judicial efficiency of adopting the contract rate as a rebuttable
presumption).
147. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 63 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5849; H. REP. No. 95-595, at 353 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6309.
148. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (2000).
149. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 62 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5848; H. REP. No. 95-595, at 352 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6308
explains:
For example, a claim on a $1,000 note issued the day before bankruptcy would
only be allowed to the extent of the case actually advanced. If the original discount
2005]
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discounting factor for claims after the commencement of the case is equiva-
lent to contractual interest rate on the claim."' 50 This occurs "because of the
irrebutable presumption that the discounting rate and the contractual interest
rate.., are equivalent."'
55
The Till plurality believed that Congress intended a uniform discount
rate be applied throughout the Code to the "numerous provisions ... like the
cramdown provision" which "discount a stream of deferred payments back to
their present dollar value."'' 5 2 If the legislative history that Congress intended
the presumptive contract rate applied to section 502 is correct and the Till
plurality is correct that Congress intended a uniform discount rate to apply
throughout the Code, then a logical deduction can be made: Congress in-
tended cram-down creditors to be presumptively given the contract rate on
deferred future payments.
B. The Implications for Individual Creditors
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., secured
creditors undoubtedly viewed the forced acceptance of a debtor's Chapter 13
repayment plan as a high-stakes game of chance. Depending upon the juris-
diction in which the debtor filed bankruptcy and the discretion of the bank-
ruptcy court judge, Chapter 13's repayment provisions could produce widely
disparate results.15 3 Exemplifying this, the justices in Till reviewed the same
set of facts and suggested methods that would have resulted in annual interest
rates ranging from 8% to 24%.
1 4
While Till adds much-needed certainty for cram-down creditors, it
comes in the form of certain misfortune. The Court's adoption of the formula
rate will ensure secured creditors are nearly always undercompensated for
was 10% so that the cash advanced was only $900, then notwithstanding the face
amount of note, only $900 would be allowed. If $900 was advanced under the note
some time before the bankruptcy, the interest component of the note would have to
be pro-rated and disallowed to the extent it was for interest after the commence-
ment of the case.
150. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 63 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5849; H. REP. No. 95-595, at 353 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6309.
151. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 63 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5849; H. REP. No. 95-595, at 353 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6309.
152. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 (2004) (plurality opinion) (quo-
tations omitted)). For a list of references within the Code to discounting future pay-
ments to present dollar values, see supra note 74.
153. For a survey of several approaches to the cram-down interest rate valuation
method, see supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
154. Till, 541 U.S. at 465, 487 (Thomas, J., concurring) (Justice Thomas advo-
cated a prime rate, which was 8%); Id. at 503-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia
argued for the presumptive contract rate, but seemed to indicate that the facts of the
case were sufficient to overcome the presumptive rate of 21% and establish a cram-
down interest rate of 24%).
1402 [Vol. 70
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their risk. Additionally, because the plurality's method ignores the terms of
the original contract, there is apparently no way to contract around the risk.
Although the Court failed to define the risk factor to be added to the prime
rate in its formula, the Court's guidance that the rate will usually be between
1% and 3% will effectively establish permissive boundaries for judicial dis-
cretion.155 By setting a maximum interest rate of prime plus 3% for the seg-
ment of our population with the greatest risk of default, it appears cram-down
creditors no longer have a chance of attaining full compensation on their
loans to debtors in bankruptcy.
C. The Scope of the Decision
While the Till case involved a determination of the cram-down rate for
secured creditors under section 1325(a)(5), the Court leaves unanswered
whether bankruptcy courts should apply this same interest rate to unsecured
claims as well. 156 In addition to its secured claim, SCS also had an unsecured
claim in the Tills' bankruptcy estate.15 7 However, the issue of the interest rate
applied to the unsecured claim was not raised by either party on appeal.
Of even greater economic significance is the uncertainty of whether the
Court's new interest rate selection method will extend beyond consumer
bankruptcies to Chapter 11 corporate reorganizations. Although the Court did
not address whether its decision would extend to Chapter 11 cases, it pro-
vided conflicting references within its opinion. First, the plurality looked at
the interest rate provisions of Chapters 11, 12, and 13 bankruptcies and con-
cluded it was "likely that Congress intended bankruptcy judges and trustees
to follow essentially the same approach when choosing an appropriate interest
rate under any of these provisions."'1 8 However, the Court later noted that,
although the provisions of Chapter 13 prevent a free market from which to
155. Id. at 480. At least one bankruptcy judge has deviated from this range. While
presiding over In re Cachu, Judge W. Richard Lee decided that the interest rate for a
local taxing authority's secured claim should be a mere 0.5% over prime. 321 B.R.
716, 724-25 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2005). He reasoned the claim had little risk of non-
payment because the claim was given priority status under California law and the
claim was secured by a lien against residential property in which the Chapter 13
debtor had significant equity. Id. at 722-23.
156. The equivalent provision for unsecured creditors is contained in 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(4) (2000). As with secured creditors, the court is required to value the claim
"as of the effective date of the plan" and ensure that the creditor is compensated for
this "value" over the life of the plan. Id.
157. Till, 541 U.S. at 470 (plurality opinion). At the time of filing, the Tills' out-
standing debt to SCS amounted to $4,894.89, while the truck securing the claim was
worth only $4,000. Id. Per 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000), SCS's secured claim was lim-
ited to $4,000, and the remaining $894.89 balance was retained as an unsecured
claim. Id.
158. Id. at 474.
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determine a market rate of interest, some creditors advertise specifically to
Chapter 11 debtors.' 59 "Thus, when picking a cram-down rate in a Chapter 11
case, it might make sense to ask what rate an efficient market would pro-
duce."
160
At least one critic has remarked that Till is a case "in which the Supreme
Court has taken a complex, difficult, murky issue and made it even more
complex, difficult and murky, at least in the Chapter 11 context."' 6 ' Although
the references in Till to Chapter II were entirely dicta, they still carry signifi-
cant weight in lower courts. 16 2 However, because the dicta is contradictory,
the district courts should feel free to disregard it, as the Supreme Court has
previously done with its own dicta.'
63
D. The Economic Impact of the Decision
Under the Court's new guidelines, lending rates are likely to increase for
all borrowers as creditors attempt to compensate for their bankruptcy
losses.164 Debtors managing to stay out of bankruptcy will be forced to subsi-
dize the under-compensated rates mandated by the cram-down provision.'
6 5
Some high-risk debtors will be unable to obtain credit.' 66 This will have the
159. Id. at 477 n.14.
160. Id. at 477.
161. Robert C. Goodrich, Jr. and Madison Cashman, Money in the "Till", 2004
No. 10 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 1, at 1.
162. See Peterson v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1392 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997)
(noting "dicta from the Supreme Court is not something to be lightly cast aside").
163. See Central Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 430 (2001) (looking to
statutory construction rather than following its own prior "admittedly confusing
dicta"); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (deciding not to follow prior
dicta that the Seventh Amendment mandated a twelve-person jury in civil trials).
164. See Todd J. Zywicki, Cramdown and the Code: Calculating Cramdown
Interest Rates Under the Bankruptcy Code, 19 THuRGOOD MARSHALL L. REV. 241
(1994). Zywicki stated:
[A]ny redistribution afforded debtors as a class as a result of [a] pro-
debtor bankruptcy rule will be eliminated by the increased rate creditors
will charge initially. The apparent pro-debtor effects of the bankruptcy
rule will be eliminated by the increased interest rates charged to debtors as
a class. At the same time, debtors who end up in bankruptcy will receive a
windfall, as they will reap the rewards of the pro-debtor bankruptcy rule.
Id.
165. See Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036, 1073 n,17
(5th Cir. 1996) (Smith, J., dissenting), rev'd, 520 U.S. 953 (1997) (arguing a pro-
debtor bankruptcy rule "might have adverse economic consequences, redistributing
wealth from responsible debtors to bad credit risks and thereby forcing good risks out
of the credit market").
166. This concern is particularly prevalent in the subprime market, where the
interest rates already approach the maximum interest rates allowed under state usury
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effect of dampening consumer spending.167 By shifting the financial respon-
sibility to non-bankrupt debtors who are able to obtain credit, the additional
burden may force more debtors into bankruptcy.
Arguably, if secured creditors were fully compensated for their risk,
some debtors already struggling to establish manageable repayment plans
would be unable to meet the additional obligations and would need to file
under Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy rather than Chapter 13. However, this
possible negative result is outweighed by the benefits of keeping additional
debtors out of bankruptcy altogether, keeping interest rates for other debtors
at lower rates, and making credit available to a higher number of consumers.
In addition, the economic impact of the Court's opinion will likely be
magnified in the future as Chapter 13 bankruptcies become more pervasive.
In the three decades since Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act,
federal courts have seen a drastic increase in the annual number of total bank-
ruptcy filings - from 200,000 cases in 1978 to 1.6 million cases in 2004.161
With the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2005,169 a greater percentage of these cases will likely be Chapter
13 cases. 70 This legislation added additional barriers to debtors seeking
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which will effectively funnel additional consumers
seeking bankruptcy protection into Chapter 13 repayment plans.171
VI. CONCLUSION
As bankruptcy reform garners substantial media attention, the Supreme
Court in Till v. SCS Credit Corp. quietly undermined the bankruptcy process
by establishing an interest rate valuation method that will consistently under
compensate secured creditors for their Chapter 13 bankruptcy claims. In
adopting its prime-plus formula, the Till plurality ignores legislative history
and adopts a standard contrary to one of the basic tenants of the Bankruptcy
Code. The Court's decision effectively established a social subsidy requiring
non-bankrupt debtors to pay for the mistakes of their bankrupt counterparts.
laws. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 5-2-201 (2002 & Supp. 2003); FLA. STAT. § 537.011
(2002 & Supp. 2003); IND. CODE § 24-4.5-3-201 (1995 & Supp. 1999); MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAW § 12-404(d) (West 2000).
167. This position was asserted in an Amicus Brief by commercial lenders in
support of SCS in this case. Brief Amicus Curiae for Commercial Lenders in support
of Respondent at *23, Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (No. 02-1016).
168. Stephen Labaton, Bankruptcy Bill Set for Passage; Victory for Bush, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005, at Al.
169. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
170. Stephen Labaton, supra note 168, at Al (noting that the means test would
prevent Chapter 7 bankruptcy for debtors earning more than half the median income
in their state and who have the ability to pay at least $6,000 over five years, and in-
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Although it is not yet clear whether this subsidy will be applied to corporate
reorganizations, even the narrowest reading of the Supreme Court's decision
indicates repercussions throughout the economy. Till's effect will only be-
come magnified when the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 2005 becomes law and additional numbers of debtors are fun-
neled into Chapter 13 debt repayment plans.
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